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A Deeper Look at Deepening Insolvency*
Neil S. Abbott, Robert Radasevich, & Keith J. Shapiro
MR. SHAPIRO: This is going to be an interesting discussion, I
think you will find. It will be for me. But before we get going, in
fairness to Rudy, who is really smarting up here about the "0" in the
middle his name - you heard them say the "J" correctly in mine.
Rudy doesn't have an "0" in the middle of his name, actually.
MR. RADASEVICH: I don't have a middle name.
MR. SHAPIRO: I thought that before the end of the session, if you
all want to hand up papers trying to figure out what the O stands for,
we can pick a middle name for Rudy. I have already taken Oz, so that
one is taken.
MR. RADASEVICH: One other point. Particularly with a topic
like this, which is kind of in its infancy and it hasn't gelled into any-
thing cohesive yet, it works better if we get a lot of audience participa-
tion. So rather than wait until the end, when you all have questions,
or you want to say something, just raise your hand and interrupt us.
We would much rather hear your thoughts than have you just listen to
us lecture.
MR. SHAPIRO: We do encourage that. Raise your hand. We will
take the questions.
This is really a funky topic. And you will see what I am saying in
the coming minutes. I am not asked very often to lecture about tort
law. I am a bankruptcy lawyer. But today what we are really doing is
talking about tort law. We are not going to be discussing a statute. It
would be, frankly, as a lecturer much easier for us to take Section 5471
and preferences and discuss all the interesting case developments
about those because you have got a statute. Everything goes back to
the statute; does it fit? How are you construing the statute? This isn't
that.
We are talking about something - I think that the professor called
it the developing tort of deepening insolvency. And I don't know if
* This is an edited version of the transcript from the second panel at the DEPAUL BUSINESS
AND COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL SYMPOSIUM, Old Code, New Code: Views on Bankruptcy from
the Bench and Bar, held on April 27, 2006.
1. 11 U.S.C. § 547.
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it's a developing tort. I don't know if it's a developing damages the-
ory. I don't know if it's a rework of pre-existing tort and damages
theories that are just being captured by another name, another count
in a complaint. And so you tell me and tell us after the session what
you think. But it has us scratching our heads over the last couple of
years.
But a lot of lawyers and financial advisors are making an enormous
amount of money litigating these issues today. What better than a
common law doctrine, where you could come up with theories until
the end of the day and allege them, and you are not bound by a stat-
ute? And now that some courts have given some credibility to these
theories, you know, Katy, bar the door. People are going to be raising
them, and they are, as you will see - I think I counted some 50 plus
filed litigation matters citing deepening insolvency as a theory over
the last two years in significant cases, typically. So something is going
on out there.
This is interesting to financial advisors and the lawyers for two rea-
sons. One, it becomes an issue of solvency, and changes in solvency,
and changes in financial performance. So this is a right to work bill
for them. And more interesting in some ways is the fact that for the
lawyers, the financial advisers, and the bankers, they are being named
as defendants in these lawsuits. You are going to see why and how in
a few moments. But it's become a hot topic because it raises all kinds
of interesting possible theories of liability against the professionals
and against the lenders and key creditors.
So let's take a run at it. And what we are going to do is I am going
to give you a little overview on what this area is as it's developed so
far. And then we are going to take a quick detour and talk about
Canada, where Neil is going to give us some context beyond the
United States as to whether this is a theory that's been adopted else-
where, how these kinds of activities are dealt with elsewhere, and we
will cover that. Then we are going to come back, and Rudy and I are
going to talk about the cases that have come down so far, some of the
trial issues, litigation issues that have been raised in these cases. And,
again, we will take your questions.
So first of all, when a company is insolvent, the directors and of-
ficers are supposed to take actions that are in the best interest of
whom? The shareholders. And that's just black letter. They exist to
service and benefit the shareholders. The insolvency incidence
changes everything under pretty well-established case law. And that's
the case law not dealing with deepening insolvency, but what we call
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today the zone of insolvency. And make sure that you distinguish as
we go along today between these two concepts.
The zone of insolvency, arguably, is that time at which the corpora-
tion is either balance sheet insolvent - it doesn't have adequate capi-
tal - it doesn't have adequate capital or assets to conduct business to
weather storm, things like that. Again, this is a common law doctrine,
too, but it's been around for a long time. It comes and goes, depend-
ing on the economy.
Under the zone of insolvency, the directors and officers, arguably,
now have a duty, not to the shareholders any longer, but to the credi-
tors. The duty shifts, arguably. Now you are insolvent? Wait a min-
ute. Forget about the shareholders. They were interesting to us when
there was value for shareholders. But now that there's no value on a
piece of paper for shareholders, your duties have shifted to the
creditors.
So we see a lot of litigation alleging a tort, effectively, for acts of D's
& O's as a means of getting, typically, to the insurance policies, the
D&O insurance policies, alleging that they behaved improperly during
the zone of insolvency by looking after the shareholders and not the
creditors.
Now, the issue we are going to talk about today takes it another
step lower. It's sort of a trust fund kind of a theory that says, "Okay.
Now you are in the zone of insolvency. How are you going to behave
in this zone?" And we have tried to identify a new tort, if you will,
that says that if you are in the zone of insolvency and you take actions
to prolong the life of the company - I have never seen the word
prolongation in a case before, and it's in every case in this area. It's a
hot word, prolongation. A prolongation of the life of the company
during this insolvent period can give rise to either this tort, if you buy
that it's a tort, or if your court buys it, or this damage theory.
So what does this mean? Okay. We are running the company and
we are trying to fix it. We are trying to get out of trouble. I mean, we
see that every day as Chapter 11 lawyers. That's what we do, is deal
with troubled businesses, frequently before they get into bankruptcy
court. And, you know, our whole Bankruptcy Code is about trying to
save debtors, keep people employed, et cetera. It's the whole philoso-
phy underlying the Code. But now you have thrown in this theory
that, wait a minute, you can try too hard, first of all. You know, what
kind of behavior constitutes this bad act during the insolvency period?
Is it just the efforts to try to turn the company around? But instead of
working, the company has gotten worse, which is many of our clients,
if not most. You know, they fight and they fight, which our laws en-
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courage, and they end up in bankruptcy at the end of the day, now
with way more debt than they had before.
Is that the bad act? Is that the act that's now actionable against
directors, officers, and, perhaps, others who participated; maybe the
accountants who wrote the financials during that period or certified
the financials during that period? Or is the act something more? Is
the act based on what you said in order to keep operating during that
period?
Just take the garden variety situation. If you are the credit manager
and an officer of the company, and you are telling all the creditors,
"Things are getting better, everything is going great, we are really
working our way out of this, we need an extra 60 days, you have to
extend us some more credit so we can get through." Have you now
become personally liable later on for the new tort of deepening insol-
vency, not because you tried to get out of trouble and help the com-
pany out of trouble, but because you misled people about your
finances while you were trying to get out of trouble? And that, as you
will see when we talk about the cases today, seems to really be where
the cases are going.
There are a lot of cases. There aren't a lot of decisions saying peo-
ple have violated the law and are liable for this tort. It's a very murky
area right now because it's in heavy litigation, typically. And you
have got decisions - and this is case law at its finest - you have got
decisions, and the authority in every decision is the last three courts
that got it at least two months before you did, and they all get cited as
the authority in the next case. And now you have a nice string cite in
your decision, but does that really make it a tort, and does that really
make this a compensable act?
So what's happening is it's evolving into, I think, into a theory that
says if you misled people financially during this zone of insolvency
period, during which the company got deeper into insolvency - and
we will talk in a moment about what that means; deeper insolvency,
how do you calculate that - if you did that through misleading acts,
fraudulent acts, now you are potentially, depending on the state, you
are potentially into the tort. And if you are not into the tort, then in
some states you are into the damages.
Maybe the tort is the good old-fashioned torts. And, by the way, I
will opine that to a great extent this is a repeat of torts that already
exist; breach of loyalty, breach of fiduciary duties by directors and
officers to the company, and that this is that by another name, a new
count in the complaint. And so in the cases where the courts buy that
that's the tort, this is being used as the damages calculation. You
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caused the company to go from this level of value - maybe it was
insolvent, but we could have liquidated it for a certain value - to a
worse state of affairs. And, in fact, maybe you are liable for all the
costs of the bankruptcy as part of the damages claim, because the
bankruptcy might not have ensued if you had liquidated out of court
and allowed people to get a higher recovery.
So you can see already, I think, from my comments how dark the
waters are here, how murky this is and how evolutionary this is right
now. We are still in the early stages. So the things we are going to be
talking about are, what have the courts been doing? What did this
court say? Is it a tort? Is it a damages theory? If it's a tort, what are
the elements of the tort? If it's a tort, what are the defenses to the
tort? What's a good defense? Are there exceptions to those defenses?
And that's really where the case law is going. That's how it really
breaks down, as you will see when we get into the cases.
Now, let's talk about, for a second, what this means. I said we don't
even know how to quantify this deepening insolvency damage that's
been incurred. Is it a balance sheet damage where the company - we
bring in the experts, the financial advisors. And the damage is that
the company was this insolvent, this far under water, and could have
liquidated for 40 cents on the dollar if you just pulled the plug with no
bankruptcy, or even filed bankruptcy then and pulled the plug and
liquidated, and comparing that against the fact that creditors are now
getting a dime on the dollar, and they have lost that 30 percent incre-
ment, plus all the costs now of cleaning up the mess that, maybe,
wouldn't have been incurred.
Is that the way that you calculate it, or do we look at the going
concern value of the company; not a balance sheet assets versus liabil-
ity? Do we look at the idea that the company might have been able to
be sold still at a multiple, as a going concern? And by the way, com-
panies that are losing money do get sold in multiples all the time. In
the biotech sector, for example, or the computer sector, you have got
publicly-traded companies that still haven't made money in ten years,
in 15 years, and everybody is betting on the technology or on the new
science. And so that's not uncommon.
Could you have sold the company? Are we now calculating the
damages here as the ability to sell the company for a going concern
value versus no longer being able to do so, in which case the damages
could be astronomical at that point in time?
Really, really tricky stuff, and stuff that courts are grappling with.
Lawyers are having fun with it. The place where you will see it, and
now you know why the bankruptcy lawyers are telling the other bank-
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ruptcy professionals about this today, is that it's coming up most fre-
quently as an action brought by trustees and an action brought by
creditors' committees in bankruptcy cases. And they are bringing
these actions not on behalf of the creditors, okay.
You know, keep in mind, this is not a direct action of the creditors,
and you are going to see this discussed in the cases. This is an action
that the corporation owns, the debtor owns. So now the company is in
the toilet. We are in bankruptcy court. We are scrappy trustees' and
creditors' committee professionals, and we are good at it. And what
we do well is - and I spend a lot of my time doing that - is scratch-
ing and clawing and trying to get leverage, to find a way to get recov-
ery from those who have money for the creditors.
What you have to do here is step in the shoes of the corporation to
try to bring this action, not in your individual capacity. And so the
question is, if the bad guys, as they typically are, are the leaders of the
corporation, the Ken Lays and the Fastows, and the Skillings, that did
this, if it's the leaders, is the company ever going to have clean hands,
if you will, in order to be able to bring the lawsuit?
You will see, as we discuss the case law and some of the litigation
strategies, that that becomes a huge issue in these cases and, frankly,
leads me, and perhaps the other panelists, to wonder if this really has
teeth in it in the long run or if this is going to be a passing fad.
MR. RADASEVICH: One of the fun things about this topic is that,
as Keith said, all of this is developing in bankruptcy court. These are
the report decisions that have come down in about the last 20 years.
Out of about 65 decisions, there's only about five that are state court
decisions. Most of those say there's no such thing as a tort of deepen-
ing insolvency.
So what you have is a bunch of bankruptcy trial lawyers, who are
clawing and scratching and trying to find assets, trying to convince a
bankruptcy court that a state court would recognize a new cause of
action.
And what state court? Is it the state court where the bankruptcy
court is situated? Is it the state selected in the choice of venue provi-
sion under the loan documents with the bank? Is it the state selected
in the choice of venue under the engagement agreement with the ac-
counting firm?
What state law is going to apply? Whatever state law applies, are
bankruptcy courts going to recognize this new tort when there's not a
single decision anywhere in that state saying anything about the tort of
deepening insolvency. They are just trying to guesstimate what state
court would do.
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In fact, there's a decision out of a state trial court in New Jersey that
says, "Wait a minute it's not my job as a trial court judge, to create
causes of action out of whole cloth, because that's what I would be
doing here. That's a job for the legislature or that's a job for the Su-
preme Court. Until they do, we don't have that tort in New Jersey."
So that's a whole other issue, and it's something that bankruptcy
judges are not very used to doing - construing whether causes of
action exist under a state's tort law.
MR. SHAPIRO: That's really what they are doing. It's painful to
watch and read in the opinions these bankruptcy court judges scouring
150-year-old state law cases in various states, not necessarily their
own, trying to figure out if this is a tort recognized in that state, so as
to be able to be brought by the trustee or the creditor's committee as
a lawsuit or a count in the lawsuit.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Has deepening insolvency ever been
used or tried to be used as grounds for replacing a debtor in posses-
sion with a trustee?
MR. SHAPIRO: I haven't seen, Lou, a case where that's been dis-
cussed. And like Rudy said, this is pretty much it, okay. And so I
think I have pretty much seen them, but I haven't seen it used. And
it's an interesting question since under the Code, when the Code talks
about cause for the appointment of a trustee in a bankruptcy case 2 -
and I should repeat the question so everyone heard it.
Lou has asked whether this theory or claim has been used as a basis
for replacing the debtor in possession from being able to continue op-
erating their business in Chapter 11, replace them with a trustee. And
I think the answer is that it's an interesting argument because cause is
not exclusively defined in the statute. Cause for appointing a trustee
is not defined in the statute 3. They give examples, but it's not an exclu-
sive list.4
So, you know, query whether you could, and say, "These guys really
screwed it up from taking" - maybe, Lou, it's consumed in a confi-
dence and gross mismanagement in the statute that's already stated.
But the query whether it is taking the company from this value at an
insolvent level to a terrible value today is an act that should cause
them to be kicked out as management during the bankruptcy. Very
interesting idea. Yes.
2. 11 U.S.C. § 1104.
3. See id.
4. See id.
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AUDIENCE MEMBER: Trustees are going to look to follow the
diverting of corporate assets by an officer. Perhaps the deepening in-
solvency issue could be part of a diversion of corporate assets which
the courts now rely on in state law and in the bankruptcy cases, since
trustees all have honest, clean hands. We have no problems.
MR. SHAPIRO: It's a problem, actually. It is a problem, I think. I
will repeat that question, too, as best I can.
Isn't this possibly a theory that could be articulated differently than
deepening insolvency; that there were breaches directly by the individ-
uals, and you are suing them, effectively, for mismanagement of funds,
absconding with the funds, et cetera, for their own benefit?
You know, those are conventional claims that we see every day.
And first of all, let me say that I agree, and it's something that really
bothers me about this doctrine. Look, I am all for getting the bad
guys, and I don't care what theory you have to use at the end of the
day. All these cases, almost every one, is about bad guys; Ponzi
schemes, things like that. That's where this doctrine comes out. And
so I am all for getting at them, but I think we already, largely, have the
theories we need in order to get to them.
I think the torts largely already exist. You know, we will see how
this ultimately gets articulated and whether the courts eventually con-
verge at the appellate level on a description of this so-called tort that
is really new and different from what's out there. But I happen to
believe that it's probably well cared for under existing tort law.
Now, part of your question, though, Gene, is a big issue you are
going to see in the cases, and that is that in the bankruptcy context,
you don't necessarily walk in as a good guy trustee when it comes to
deepening insolvency. And where the cases are going on this is that
541 of the Bankruptcy Code talks about property of the estate as it
existed on the date of filing, not how it looks today with this nice
trustee who is a good guy or woman with very clean hands, looking
out for the benefit of creditors. 5
When the courts look at the company, the plaintiff bringing the
case, they are looking at the plaintiff on the day it filed, not the mo-
ment after it filed. And that plaintiff, depending - you will see they
have some very interesting definitions they have come up with - if
the corporation had dirty hands as opposed to the individuals running
it - and you will see how they break this down - then these cases
are being thrown out. And "in pari delicto" is the Latin for this. And,
to me, it's unclean hands by the corporation, in simpler terms.
5. 11 U.S.C. § 541.
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And cases are very regularly being thrown out. A lot of these cases
in Rudy's stack here are losers, and they are losers because of in pari
delicto. If you had brought the suit, Gene, as a receiver, not as a trus-
tee, you would be fine, it looks like, under the case law because you
don't have Section 541 of the Code defining this, and that's what the
courts are telling us.
And so if you brought it as an assignee for the benefit of creditors
you might be fine. But as a bankruptcy trustee or a creditor's commit-
tee bringing this suit for the estate, you may have lost because you
don't get the benefit of this old doctrine. And there is a doctrine of a
successor - I forget the name off the top of my head. There is a
clean-handed successor doctrine, if you will, that is out there, and it's
followed in the case law under a number of torts, which I think, proba-
bly, you could argue fits here, but for the bankruptcy.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: There is a whole body of law under com-
mon law. This is a tort regarding fraud. And the bankruptcy court
has recognized this when the fraud had to do with the consumer being
defrauded.
Has any of these courts looked at the body of law? If the credit
manager was deceiving the creditors, that's a misrepresentation. They
were damaged. There is a whole body of law that goes back 100 years
that talks about misrepresentations that caused damage.
MR. RADASEVICH: Courts do look at that with respect to claims
by the individual creditors. The difficulty with this cause of action is
when it's brought by a trustee or a creditor's committee, they can only
recover harm to the debtor, to the corporation.
So the fact that the corporation's creditors all were lighter than
water, as my kids would say, and took less than they would have re-
ceived had this company remained not quite as underwater as it was,
doesn't give the debtor a cause of action to pursue. The debtor has to
pursue damages that are different than the losses to its customers.
That's not a recovery that a trustee can obtain or a creditor's commit-
tee can obtain. They have to try to get separate and individual dam-
ages to the debtor.
And there's not a lot of case law on damages because this is still in
the primordial soup of litigation. And none of these cases have gone
to trial, there's one called Bookland6 out of Maine that's close. But
other than that, all of these cases are being decided at the motion to
dismiss stage, where courts are trying to come to grips with what
6. Bookland of Me. v. Baker, Newman & Noyes, L.L.C., 271 F. Supp. 2d 324 (D. Me. 2003).
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pleading requirements are, and you don't really have to plead dam-
ages as much as seek damages.
So to answer your question, defrauding a customer will give the cus-
tomer claims. It doesn't give the debtor claims. And the trustee and a
creditor's committee are only pursuing claims the Debtor has.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: That's not my question. Substitute the
word "consumer" in the consumer law cases for the word "Creditor"
misrepresentation. The creditor is being deceived here.
MR. SHAPIRO: First of all, I think the answer begins with what
Rudy said. In the first instance, the creditors may have individual
claims against the people who defrauded them as well as the company.
That's number one. And you would lose at that point, as far as bring-
ing it for the company.
But a clever counsel, trying to put together a cause of action here,
would articulate it differently, I think. They would say in the trade
vendor context, which is now what you have clarified your question is
about - for trade vendor, "I extended additional credit to this com-
pany by virtue of misrepresentations being made to me by people at
the company." Now the company has been hurt by being forced into
deepening insolvency because it took on more debt through those mis-
representations and put the company in worse shape, and now the
corporation has been hurt, arguably, if you buy this as a tort. The
company has been hurt by going deeper into insolvency, and now I
have articulated, whether you buy it or not, the deepening insolvency
theory on those facts. And that's how you would do it, I think.
And, you know, look, some of the cases go back to, you know, stuff
the law students here probably remember better than we do because
this is what we all learned in law school; that where there is an injury,
the law provides a remedy. And we all start with that in tort class.
That's what the courts are talking about in these cases. Is there an
injury where there's no remedy already? As Gene put it, isn't there
already a way to collect here? But they are trying to reconstruct this as
not an individual claim by a bunch of disbursed creditors against peo-
ple or the company. But now the company has been injured.
And why are they doing this? Anybody in the audience want to
guess why they are trying to do this and push this theory?
MR. RADASEVICH: They want to get the lenders.
MR. SHAPIRO: They want to get to the lenders and the D&O
policies; the directors' and officers' insurance policies. If the corpora-
tion was harmed by its directors and officers, now you have implicated
the insurance policies.
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You know, Worldcom, the D&Os paid $18 million in. How much
debt was there in Worldcom? How many billions and billions of dol-
lars? And everyone boasts, "Hey, we got to the directors and of-
ficers." You know, 18 million is still good money on the southwest
side of Chicago where I grew up.
MR. RADASEVICH: What if you have exculpation clauses in your
corporate organizational documents exculpating directors and officers
for acts of their own malfeasance if they agree to be directors? Do
you then waive your right to go after these guys on a deepening insol-
vency basis?
MR. SHAPIRO: Let's go to Canada for awhile.
MR. ABBOTT: Thank you. First of all, thank you again for the
opportunity to come and speak with you. I do have a paper which is
in your material, so I don't have to go on as much as my friends have.
And I am sure that their discussion may be a little bit more interesting
than what I am about to say. But the title of the paper is "Another
Canadian Compromise."'7
And Canada, I think, is a compromise in and of itself between the
United States and Great Britain. We like compromise. We don't like
torts. We don't, generally, have civil jury trials. And if we do, the
judges tend to say, you know, "You really don't want a civil jury trial."
The maximum punitive damages award, according to our Supreme
Court of Canada, is $100,000. That's Canadian, by the way, which
isn't too bad now. We are about 85 cents on the dollar.
So we look at this with great fascination because we have already
come up with a solution to the problem. We have created by statute a
corporation act in each province and federally. And the Business
Corporations Act 8 - and I append them to the back of my paper -
they, essentially, provide for creditors and shareholders and any other
interested party. You don't even have to have a necessary financial
interest in the company, although it would be a very hard case to
make if you didn't.
You can go to the Court if you feel that an officer, a director, an
advisor, a principal, an employee has been oppressive of your rights.9
It's been characterized as one of the broadest, most liberal - liberal
in the small L sense of the word - statutes providing for these types
of remedies in the world. And I have prosecuted or litigated a num-
ber of oppression remedy cases.
7. Prepared for presentation at the Symposium.
8. R.S.C., ch. C-44, §§ 1-268 (1985) (Can.).
9. Id. § 241.
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It allows us to pierce the corporate veil. It allows us to move as a
creditor not just, as I say, a shareholder, to challenge an act or an
omission by a director or an officer, et cetera, of a company.
Now, has it succeeded in the case of an insolvency? The short an-
swer is, not yet. I do cite in my paper - and I should say a word
about citing. I did not bring with me the various cases that I referred
to. And for those of you who have a dying fascination to read about
Canadian law and Canadian cases, I am going to give you a web site
that you can go to that has it all: www.canlii.com. And you can go
there and you can type in a word, and you can find every statute from
all ten provinces, three territories, and the federal government as well
as case law that evolves from there.
And the courts in Canada, and certainly in Ontario - and, again, I
am not sure if there are any Canadians in the audience. I know a lot
of you come up to fish and buy Cuban cigars, and all those other won-
derful things that you can do up in our fair country. But Ontario has
close to 40 percent of the population, and it has at least 60 percent of
the business in Canada. So we are fortunate that we don't, as I was
saying to my colleagues up here, we don't have the dichotomy that
you have between a federal and a state court.
We have one bankruptcy court. We have one bankruptcy act for the
country, and we can actually use an acronym for ours. It's called the
BIA, the Bankruptcy And Insolvency Act 10 , as opposed to your Debt
- Fairness Debt - blah, blah. Whatever you call it.
Anyway, the judges that opine about Canadian bankruptcy law, for
the most part, are resident in Ontario. So we do have a consistency.
And our supreme court is not very much interested in commercial law
disputes. They like criminal law and they like charter arguments,
which is equivalent to your bill of rights.
So the Court of Appeal in Ontario is generally the court of last
resort for commercial disputes. And very recently, in a case that I cite
on page 12 of my paper - it's an Ontario Court of Appeal decision
where the Court re-affirmed what we call the Business Judgment Rule
in Canada." And this is the closest case that I could find to someone
taking a shot on the basis of deepening insolvency.
This was a leather goods company that was, essentially, on the verge
of insolvency, and the directors of the company failed to disclose
fourth quarter reports because the reports, actually, said that the com-
pany isn't going to do so well. But the directors felt, "You know, we
10. R.S.C., c. B-3, §§ 1-275 (1985) (Can.).
11. Kerr v. Danier Leather Inc., [2005] O.A.C.
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think we are going to do well." And there's a certification of a class
action by one of the creditors in the case. And I cite both the trial
level and the Court of Appeal level decision.
At the trial level, the judge, who is one of our more senior bank-
ruptcy judges, he did find that the officers and directors were liable in
misleading the creditors in, essentially, causing the company to go fur-
ther into insolvency and cause damages, et cetera. 12 The Court of Ap-
peal reversed that.13 They said, essentially, that businesses are
entitled to be run by their officers or directors, and even if they are
wrong, so long as they acted in good faith, et cetera. "Even if they
didn't act in good faith but, you know, at the end of the day they made
the right business decision, we are not going to interfere with that."
And if you do want to interfere with that, creditors, et cetera, you
have other remedies to do that. You can go under the oppression
remedy cases, et cetera. The problem here was oppression wasn't re-
ally something that could be established.
So in Ontario, we have said no deepening insolvency. We have said
we already have a statute in place that addresses these issues. If you
want to go there and seek your redress, give it a shot. I can tell you
that the likelihood of success of a deepening insolvency case in Ca-
nada is very slim, again, on the basis that we like to uphold the Busi-
ness Judgment Rule, and also that we don't have, as I said at the
outset, a real interest in torts and an interest in litigating disputes. We
try to find a compromise and a resolution.
And our Bankruptcy Code, our Federal Code, also provides for
protection from liability for trustees and some other professionals who
give advice to businesses when they are entering the insolvency
zone.
14
And the last word I will mention is with respect to the insolvency
zone, because one of my colleagues asked me about that. There is a
book I referred to as well, and it's on page 9 of my material, and I will
just read from it. "To date Canadian law has not yet recognized that
merely continuing to carry on business, knowing that the corporation
is insolvent and will be unable to pay its liabilities as they become due,
constitutes unfair or oppressive conduct.' 15
So we don't even have the insolvency zone problem in our country.
If you can carry on your business, you don't have to disclose the finan-
cial state to creditors. If creditors want to take a shot at you, use the
12. Kerr v. Danier Leather Inc., [2004] O.R.3d
13. Kerr v. Danier Leather Inc., [2005] O.A.C.
14. R.S.C., c. B-3, §§ 15-41 (1985) (Can.).
15. DIRECTORS' LIABILITIES IN CASE OF INSOLVENCY 401 (Anker Sorensen ed., 1999).
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oppression remedy section. But I can tell you, most courts will shut
that down.
MR. SHAPIRO: Let's take a vote on who likes the Canadian laws
better than the United States.
MR. ABBOTT: Did I mention our tax laws? We can get into that.
MR. SHAPIRO: Thanks, Neil. Okay. Let's turn for a little bit to
some of the cases, just so you can get a feel for what the courts are
doing and saying in these cases and how - where some of the vari-
ances are.
One of the leading cases - maybe the leading case on this so far is
a case - and it's in the materials, so you don't have to write it all
down. It's Lafferty16, L-a-f-f-e-r-t-y. It's a Third Circuit Court of Ap-
peals decision from 2001. And Lafferty is interesting because it's a
good old-fashioned Ponzi scheme.
For the students in the room, a Ponzi scheme is very simple. Money
is coming in, being promised a return on investment and, typically, it's
going to pay others who have already invested and been promised a
return on investment rather than going into the operations of the busi-
ness, and it just gets bigger and bigger and bigger until it bursts. And
these are the kind of bad actors I was talking about earlier that tend to
find themselves in these deepening insolvency reported decisions.
So this was a leasing company, or a series of them, that - no rela-
tion - the Shapiro family ran to operate their scheme. What these
guys did - and it was a family. They all had senior offices, appar-
ently, in the corporation. They were issuing fraudulent debt certifi-
cates and selling them to individual debtors to raise money.
And what they did, as I recall, is they actually set up a subsidiary.
They were so insolvent at one point, and they were stuck. And it's a
Ponzi scheme, and it dies if you don't have more cash coming in from
third parties. They created a subsidiary that looked like it had a
cleaner balance sheet; in some ways reminiscent of the allegations you
see in some of the Enron litigation. It's off balance sheet stuff that
you read about.
So now they started selling certificates at this cleaner looking sub-
sidiary and, eventually, of course, it busted. The creditor's committee
comes in and sues a variety of third parties, including most of the prin-
cipals, alleging that they fraudulently - remember that word "fraudu-
lently" - induced the corporations to issue securities, thereby
deepening their insolvency. They were in trouble. They were in debt,
16. Official Comm. Of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., 267 F.3d 340 (3d Cir.
2001).
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if you will. And they should have taken an action at that point, but
instead, they created the scam, brought in more debt, using misrepre-
sentation and fraud to gain that additional debt, and now the company
is in even worse shape and is in bankruptcy.
So the creditor's committee brings that theory. They get in front of
the Third Circuit ultimately, and the Third Circuit said, first of all,
about state law, that they had to look at whether the right of action
belongs to the debtor or the creditors under state law. So it's the first
part of the process for the Court. Is it a theory? And if it is, who does
it belong to?
They talk about the mismanagement, and they say - again, you will
see them trying to define the tort in the tests here - "[W]here fraud,
mismanagement, or other wrong damages a corporation's assets, a
shareholder does not have a direct cause of action. Rather, it is the
corporate body that suffers the primary wrong."
17
Now, in this case they - you see they are all straining. They are
citing from one another and thinking about this out loud. They cite
the old jurisprudential proposition I mentioned earlier. They are look-
ing to see if there is an injury that needs a remedy here. And they say,
"The damages that could have occurred here are the following." This
raises all kinds of new issues, in my mind. "[T]he incurrence of debt
can force an insolvent corporation into bankruptcy, thus inflicting le-
gal and administrative costs on the corporation. ' 18
Number two, "When brought on by unwieldy debt, bankruptcy also
creates operational limitations which hurt the corporation's ability to
run its business in a profitable manner." 19  Number three,
"[D]eepening insolvency can undermine a corporation's relationship
with its customers, suppliers, and employees. ' 20 And I would just di-
gress; so can high prices. Four, "[P]rolonging a corporation's life
through bad debt may simply cause the dissipation of corporate
assets." 21
So you have got these courts at the circuit level. And with all due
respect to them, you know, I am living every day in the operating side
of these troubled companies. It's not that simple, I would suggest. It's
not that simple. There are a lot of things that can cause a disruption in
the relationships that are very good faith efforts to keep the company
alive. You realize you no longer can pay on 60 days, but you still have
17. Id. at 348.
18. Id. at 349.
19. Id. at 350.
20. Id.
21. Id.
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a viable restructuring plan. Is the fact that you took on more credit
and went to 90 days or 100 days with creditors, is that a bad act? Well,
the answer may be, if you fraudulently convinced them to do it,
perhaps.
But it worries me when a doctrine like this potentially could go into
all kinds of ordinary behaviors, good faith behavior; not only that, but
behavior we would want to encourage. We wrote a whole bankruptcy
code in the late '70s to encourage this kind of restructuring behavior.
And if the courts aren't careful and very judicious in how they allow
this doctrine to exist, you run the risk of really chilling the willingness
of operators of businesses, equity holders of businesses, lenders, finan-
cial advisers, lawyers to participate in the process. And so you have
got to really be careful how you define it.
MR. RADASEVICH: You don't even need in that Lafferty case -
really, in any of these cases, you don't need the theory of deepening
insolvency to go after the insiders. The insiders all owe fiduciary du-
ties to the company; period. Sue them for their fiduciary duties. If
you think there may be a measure of damages, yada, yada, fine. Sue
them for breach of their fiduciary duties. Get that in front of a jury.
Get that claim out there. They need to go to deepening insolvency,
like in the Lafferty case, because they wanted to get the auditors.
Now, most every state recognizes liability for aiding and abetting a
breach of fiduciary duty. So they could have sued the auditors, and
did, for aiding and abetting the breach of fiduciary duty. But to prove
aiding and abetting, there is a scienter requirement. You have to
prove that the third party, the auditors, knew that the insiders were
breaching their fiduciary duties and provided substantial assistance to
allow them to do that. That's a difficult thing to prove. Plaintiffs
don't want to have to prove that.
They would rather sweep third parties in, and that's what this deep-
ening insolvency theory tries to do. It tries to sweep third parties into
the case without trying to prove complicity. Because if you had to
prove complicity, why have the theory at all? Just get them for aiding
and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty; you already have them in the
case.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Neil mentions that in Canada there is a
pretty strong business judgment rule. Isn't that the case in the States
as well? Isn't that the initial line of defense?
MR. RADASEVICH: There is a relatively recent decision that
came out called Global Services Group. 22 It's at 316 Bankruptcy Re-
22. In re Global Serv. Group L.L.C., 316 B.R. 451 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004).
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porter 451. And in that case, they sued the insiders, like they always
do, and they also sued the outside accountants, auditors, and every-
body they could. And they went after the lender, saying, "You knew
this company was insolvent. You lent it money. You should have
known it couldn't pay you back. Other people, based upon the
strength of your credit facility with this debtor, continue to do busi-
ness with it, continue to extend it credit. You drove it into the ground,
and you helped the officers and directors do that."
What the bankruptcy court in that case said was, "Wait a minute.
Wait a minute. This is simple business judgment rule stuff. You ha-
ven't alleged in your complaint that the officers and directors did any-
thing wrong, that they acted fraudulently. All you have alleged is that
they operated an insolvent company and it didn't work out, and they
used the lender's money to do it." It may have been a bad loan, but
it's not a tort. The insiders were shielded by the business judgment
rule, and the court threw out the case.
The cases where you find this argument having any legs at all are
cases where there's rampant fraud; the Ponzi scheme in Lafferty or
there's another case - another series of cases called Parmalat Securi-
ties Litigation where they created offshore companies and stocked
them up with half a billion dollars worth of assets in order to defraud
creditors and had family insiders fleece money out of the company.23
You see the theory getting a little more legs in those types of cases.
But in a pure business judgment rule case, what Global Services said
is, "You are out. You have no cause of action."
MR. SHAPIRO: Again, one thing, I think, we learned from look-
ing at a survey of these cases is that you better be able to argue and
prove misrepresentation - intentional misrepresentation or fraud if
you want to really have a case that sticks under this theory. And you
will see in this stack of cases, most of them are thrown out if you can't
show misrepresentation or fraud.
Now, Rudy mentioned the aiding and abetting concept. And
there's actually a recent case on that, too, and that's the Adelphia
Communications Corporation case 24- a pretty high profile case In
the Southern District of New York in '05. And they try to articulate
what the elements are to show an aiding and abetting claim. And they
say the Plaintiff must allege: number one, the existence of the primary
violation, this deepening insolvency tort, the knowledge of the viola-
23. See In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 383 F. Supp. 2d 616 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (listing the entire series
of cases).
24. In re Adelphia Commc'ns Corp. Sec. and Derivative Litig., No. 03-MDL-1529LMM, 2005
WL 1404798 (S.D.N.Y. June 14, 2005).
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tion on the part of the aider and abetter, and, number three, substan-
tial assistance by the aider and abetter in achieving the primary
violation.
Now, you could take Enron, because everyone seems to know the
facts of Enron, and start to see where these kinds of theories for aid-
ing and abetting could be very interesting. You have all kinds of in-
dicted staffers in the accounting departments of these companies that
helped create the financial statements or didn't say anything and saw
the creation of the statements. Have they committed the crime or the
tort of deepening insolvency? Real interesting questions.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: This aiding - I am not an attorney; I am
an appraiser.
MR. SHAPIRO: Your opinion matters more, for sure.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I can see where there could be some
problems with this. And we put a lot of disclaimers on our appraisal
reports that we turn in, and somehow some of us get in trouble. Are
we going to go any further in discussing this later today, or what?
MR. SHAPIRO: We only have so much time, but I will tell you
that you should be seeing red flags which, I guess, you are, that this is
a risk for accounting firms. I hadn't thought of appraisers, but you are
absolutely right. You create the appraisals upon which the creditors
rely in extending more debt. And if it's alleged that you did a lousy
job and, kind of, took the debtor's word for it in putting - MAI, if
you will, made as instructed appraisal, you could be named in one of
these.
And when you look through the cases - when you get into one of
these and start looking at the cases, you will see that KPMG is named
as a defendant in one of them. Bank of America is named in the
Parmalat cases that Rudy referred to.25 You know, they are looking
for deep pockets. And guess where that tends to be; the insurance
companies and all the professionals. And that's where this theory
seems to be slipping to, is a way of bringing in more than just the
directors and officers.
You had a follow-up?
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes. We are seeing, as you mentioned, a
lot of this coming on. And I know in several of mine that I put some
of these disclosures in. And maybe it's setting off a flag with banks. I
don't know. But in those appraisal reports, I want them to know that
what I can see or what they are being presented with is all that's been
given to me.
25. In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 383 F. Supp. 2d 616 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
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And I know they have been after several of them. I think some-
body just said or it's in the newspaper that ten percent is attributable
to a fraud. And I know in Indiana, where I'm from, the FBI has been
very active in that area. And so my suspicion is that we are going to
have to be very careful as to how we present those reports. It may
well be that several banks don't want to do business with us.
MR. RADASEVICH: Putting things on like disclaimers, it's like
when you go and look at a corporation's financial statements, and
they always have that big disclaimer written by lawyers at the end
saying, "These are forward-looking statements." Don't rely on them.
We may be lying through our teeth. Don't rely on these. Those types
of disclaimers mean almost nothing. It's like when you take your kid
to Disneyland. On the back of the ticket, you waive all your kid's
rights. You can't waive any of your kid's rights. So don't think dis-
claimers will shield you. They will only get you sued.
What will help you is if you are a lender, act like a lender. Don't act
like a business manager. Don't put on a lot of restrictions as to how
the debtor is supposed to operate its business. Be extremely careful
on restrictions you put in as to how the debtor is supposed to use its
money.
Be extremely careful about toggling the situation in such a way that
the debtor is forced to stay out of bankruptcy for long enough to avoid
the avoidance periods on the liens you received, which caused the
lender to get sued in one of these deepening insolvency cases. So you
have to be careful. But disclaimers will do practically nothing.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: What I have done is transferred all my
assets to my wife.
MR. RADASEVICH: That's good. I will give you account num-
bers for the 529 accounts for my kids, if you have anything left over.
MR. SHAPIRO: Give us her name. We will do the same thing.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: What about SEC law? Are any of the
courts considering - there's a lot of regulations of this kind if it's a
publicly held company, and all of the regulations and administrative
cases involving the Securities and Exchange Commission. Does that
have any effect on this at all?
MR. RADASEVICH: There's the whole Sarbanes-Oxley thing.26 I
could put a different hat on and we could talk about that for awhile.
But that hasn't really found its way into these cases yet because, re-
member, the cases are coming from the bankruptcy litigators. They
really have this mindset.
26. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7201-7266 (2006).
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There's not a case here where a creditor has tried the deepening
insolvency theory because, remember, by definition, the deepening in-
solvency theory is a cause of action to be pursued by the debtor, not
its creditors. I will read the definition that most courts use: It's the
fraudulent prolongation of a corporation's life beyond solvency, re-
sulting in damages to the corporation caused by increased debt.
SEC regulations often have little to do with appraisers. They may
have little to do with other outside professionals, workout groups that
a troubled debtor may go to. We were speaking to one counsel earlier
who does a lot of out-of-court workouts and composition agreements
so a company can avoid bankruptcy. When they work, they are great.
When they don't, you are really subjecting yourself to the risk of suit.
If you as an outside professional guiding a debtor, a putative debtor,
through a composition arrangement that blows up, and during the
time period the debtor goes from here under water (Demonstrating)
to under water here, you are going to find yourself getting sued. You
will have defenses of the business judgment rule, in pari delicto, all
these other things, but all this means is that the debtor's lawyers will
bill bankruptcy estates, where nobody is really paying the bill, to liti-
gate these claims against you.
MR. SHAPIRO: Let's take a minute now. And here is a great ex-
ample of what we have been telling you about how hot this idea of
deepening insolvency has become. Here is a news release dated the
25th of April, so Tuesday of this week.27 Having heard us for over an
hour now talk about this theory, now you are experts like we are. You
tell me if there isn't a deepening insolvency theory contained in the
Complaint I am going to tell you about.
And this Complaint is under seal, apparently, in the Refco case.
Everyone has heard the Refco name in the last year due to the huge
scandal there. You tell me if they are not talking about a deepening
insolvency theory. When we see this Complaint some day, if we do, I
promise you it's in there somewhere.
"Seeking more than $1.3 billion, unsecured creditors for Refco, Inc.
are suing Austrian bank Bawag PSK Group, accusing the financier of
helping propel the futures broker into bankruptcy through a series of
fraudulent loans to Refco's embattled former chief. Central to the
allegations is the $420 million loan from Bawag to former Refco CEO
Phil Bennett in October of '05, just days before Refco stunned Wall
Street with its massive insolvency. '28
27. Peter A. McKay, Refco's Creditors Sue Austrian Bank, WALL ST. J., April 25, 2006, at C5.
28. Id.
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Now, the article goes on to say that Bennett used the Bawag loan to
repay $430 million in bad debt to Refco's Bennett-controlled subsidi-
ary, Refco Group Holdings, the last place Plaintiffs say Bennett
floated the debt in an effort to hide it.29 So he moved some debt. He
took some money from these guys to cover certain debts, moved it
into other entities to try to prop up Refco and make it look good, I
think, is the allegation there.
So now this is a third party helping him, arguably, create more debt
for the company, keep it going, keep incurring more debt and losses,
and deceiving the public at a time when they were already, probably,
insolvent.
The allegations outlined in court documents suggest that such trans-
actions took place with regularity, arranged specifically to help Ben-
nett's Refco unit and Bawag hide their mutual debt. So you are
seeing - this is not an accident, the way this release reads, I think.
These guys are telling you the elements. They read these cases, too.
They are telling you the elements of a deepening insolvency theory
here, and they are going to be suing Bawag, and they are probably
going to sue others who may have participated.
I suspect you may see lawyers and accountants and others sued, po-
tentially. In the Parmalat cases that Rudy referred to, there's more
than one reported decision, by the way. Parmalat comes out of New
York.30 It's the Italian company where there's similar massive fraud
creating fake assets, moving debts off the balance sheet into other en-
tities, things like that.
In Parmalat, it's wild when you read the decisions, because they are
rambling through - one case is all about Illinois law.31 They brought
one under Illinois law, which they said this tort doesn't exist in Illinois.
Another case, they brought it under another state's law.
And the interesting thing, and something I am beginning to observe
anecdotally in talking to lawyers in some of the states where these
cases are being filed, is Delaware, for instance, has some cases already
that are very positive on the existence of this tort; that they endorse
the existence of this tort. New York has almost exclusively said no
way, and found in pari delicto very frequently as a valid defense.
MR. RADASEVICH: What that means for you non-lawyers is that
an entity cannot sue another wrong-doer for a wrong that the entity
participated in. Since the officers and directors of the company con-
29. Id.
30. In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 383 F. Supp. 2d 616 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
31. See In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 421 F. Supp. 2d 703 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
2006]
550 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL
trol the company - and, again, it's the company suing - the com-
pany won't be able to sue another wrong-doer for something that it
facilitated or participated in through its own officers and directors.
That's what it means.
MR. SHAPIRO: This is the thing we were talking about earlier.
And there is an exception in some states for that, for the innocent
successor that we were being asked about earlier.
So now let's take my little theory for a minute. I think from anec-
dotal conversations, for instance, that the lawyers in Delaware are
very concerned that this means to be taking root in Delaware because
it's not protective, if you will, of directors and officers. And let's re-
member where the whole Delaware corporation thing originally came
from. People find that to be a very corporate friendly jurisdiction, and
maybe these rulings are not so corporate friendly against directors and
officers.
So there's some talk about proposing legislation in Delaware that
would define what the deepening insolvency theory is so that it might
stay a more friendly director and officer and corporation jurisdiction.
So be on the lookout for something like that in Delaware and, per-
haps, other states. Frankly, as a lawyer, just tell me what the law is
and don't leave me with a stack of cases as the law. It would make life
a lot easier and, frankly, would save a lot of money for a lot of partici-
pants in these cases.
MR. RADASEVICH: He is a bankruptcy lawyer. Litigators - we
love controversy because we never know what side of the equation we
are going to be on.
MR. SHAPIRO: Rudy carries this around when he is not lecturing.
MR. RADASEVICH: I love this. In Illinois we don't know what
the law of deepening insolvency is. You have a Southern District of
New York Bankruptcy Court saying there is no such theory under Illi-
nois law. You have the Seventh Circuit in the Schact v. Brown case 32 a
few years ago saying, "We are not going to tell you it's not an element
of damages." And then you have a judge in the Central District of
Illinois in the Fleming Packaging cases - there is a decision at 336
Bankruptcy Reporter 39833 - saying, "I am not going to say there
isn't one yet. We are in the pleadings stage. I am not going to say
there isn't one yet. I am going to take it down the road a little farther
before I decide."
32. Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343 (7th Cir. 1983).
33. See In re Fleming Packaging Corp., 336 B.R. 398 (Bankr. C.D. I11. 2006).
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What the judges may not appreciate is that litigants are spending
hundreds and hundreds of thousands of dollars during motion practice
and discovery, and it's egregiously expensive to do that.
MR. SHAPIRO: Let's take another twist on this for a minute and
consider this: Now you are in the insolvency phase, okay. The zone of
insolvency has occurred. Lights are flashing, and you are in the zone
now as a director and officer. And now what do you do when you are
in the zone, as frequently happens? You bring in crisis managers,
right? You bring in insolvency attorneys to help counsel you.
And now you go another year, sometimes two years in this troubled
state where you are trying to fix the problems. You know, some peo-
ple suggest GM may be in that stage. I don't know. But you are in
trouble and you are trying to work through it. As a crisis manager,
have you walked into a potential liability situation? You don't always
know what representations have been made or are being made by
people within the company. You are not always aware until you get
well into it what's really happening, and that's very frequent in these
cases.
MR. RADASEVICH: Almost by a definition, a crisis manager al-
ways walks into a potential deepening insolvency problem; always, or
he wouldn't be there. They are not brought in to help healthy compa-
nies too often.
So it's really interesting to think that we have Title 11 so that we can
save companies, and we just don't have straight liquidations. But if
you try to save a floundering company outside a bankruptcy court,
god forbid, you might get sued.
MR. SHAPIRO: And we will take the last questions in a moment.
You know, I think that if this is going to be a tort that's going to stick
and that's going to have legs and be an established doctrine in the
years to come, it's got to be tightly defined by the courts, ultimately by
the circuit courts, so that people are clear what it is. It's got to be
focused on fraud and misrepresentation or it's going to cause a lot of
harm in the everyday cases where there wasn't wrongdoing. It's got to
be very carefully construed.
Now, I will say I may and Rudy may re-think that when we are
being paid by a client to analyze these issues. Professor Countryman,
the great Harvard bankruptcy professor, famously once said, when
asked, I think, in Congress about a position he was taking relative to
something he had once written, that he thinks better when he is being
paid. So whatever. You know, this is a developing doctrine, but that's
what I think has got to happen.
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Rudy, maybe you want to comment before we take the question on
where you think this is going.
MR. RADASEVICH: I don't think it's a job for the circuit courts.
I think it's a job for the state courts; state courts and state legislatures.
There's no such thing as federal common law. You can't let a bunch
of bankruptcy lawyers make the stuff up out of whole cloth, even if
they are really good at doing just that.
I have also had the privilege of litigating bankruptcy issues in state
court. Try that sometime. Most state court judges have no idea what
you are talking about. Bankruptcy judges may be very astute at deal-
ing with bankruptcy-related issues and the type of commercial issues
they face every day, and by and large they basically are. But you
throw "Let's develop a new tort" in front of them, and this is what you
get. This is what you get.
MR. SHAPIRO: That's the litigator in Rudy speaking. Of course,
he is wrong in what he says, because out of a practical consideration,
the cases aren't being filed, as he said, in the state courts. They are
just not getting filed there. They are coming up in the bankruptcy
form, so they are ending up in the circuit courts. And whether that - I
will say, Rudy, it's probably the place it should be decided.
MR. RADASEVICH: The court of appeals has the ability all the
time to refer a state court question to a state supreme court to get an
adjudication. That's what they should do. They have no business cre-
ating state law out of whole cloth. They just don't. If this came before
the Seventh Circuit, they will either say, "No, it's up to the state
court," or, depending on who the panel is, they might refer it over to
the Illinois Supreme Court.
MR. SHAPIRO: Let's take that question.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: What role are the insurance companies,
the malpractice insurance or the director - insurance companies tak-
ing on this? Are they worried that this is going to affect them? Be-
cause they are going to be the ultimate payers on this.
MR. RADASEVICH: Well, two problems: One, they have a duty
to defend and a duty to pay, which are two different things. Duty to
defend is if it's potentially coverable. Duty to pay is if they proved it.
So plaintiff's lawyers may throw in a negligence claim, which would be
covered under your policy. If the suit is only an intentional tort, and
it's big enough dollars, I think the insurance company would file a
declaratory action in a minute so they don't have an obligation even
to continue to defend.
But that defense, as you can tell, would be a massive, expensive
undertaking. They haven't been sued yet. I haven't seen a case
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against insurance companies. But there are cases out there against -
I will give you a list - auditors, underwriters, merger and acquisition
professionals, workout professionals, attorneys, customers, potential
buyers, lenders and, of course, officers and directors are low hanging
fruit.
MR. SHAPIRO: You have a question.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I may have missed it. I apologize. But
that stack of cases over there, how many decisions were found that
there was liability under that theory?
MR. RADASEVICH: Again, these are only the pleading stage. So
you have courts in Pennsylvania saying that the theory exists. You
have courts in Delaware saying the theory exists. You have courts
interpreting Illinois law saying maybe it exists, maybe it doesn't exist.
But the Seventh Circuit is saying, "We think it's an element of dam-
ages." But to be an element of damages, you have to have your un-
derlying tort claim, and then we will try to define what that element of
damages is.
The only case out there that really speaks of damages so far is a case
called Southwest Supermarkets,34 325 Bankruptcy Reporter 417. Re-
member, it's difficult for the debtor to say how the debtor was injured
in a deepening insolvency case, because usually when you keep some-
thing alive, it's a good thing. What they argued in that Southwest Su-
permarkets case was that the damage was the diminution of the
enterprise value of the business. Even though GM may have lost $3
Billion last quarter, and maybe, on a balance sheet, is technically in-
solvent, it's got a real nice value on the New York Stock Exchange.
So they look at the decline in the enterprise value of a company -
that's where they were going in that case. None of this stuff has gone
to trial yet, but that's one element - I think, one aspect of damages
plaintiffs will try and prove.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: This may just be a vehicle for them to
find liability under some other theory; start out talking about this and
then say, "Well, this doesn't really exist, but you do have liability
here."
MR. RADASEVICH: The Parmalat cases are classic for that.35
What they say is that, "No, you have breach of fiduciary duty, you
have aiding and abetting, you have fraud. That's enough. You are
trying to recast something. We are not going to let you do it.
34. In re Sw. Supermarkets, LLC, 325 B.R. 417 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2005).
35. See In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 383 F. Supp. 2d 616 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (listing the entire series
of cases).
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MR. SHAPIRO: This is really early stage litigation right now.
Most of these cases are either being dismissed in the motion to dismiss
or summary judgment stage and haven't been litigated or are in the
early stages or mid stages of discovery. As I have said, we found over
50 filed cases over the last two years, and pretty good size cases,
around the country where these cases are being filed.
And, frankly, you know, if you have observed the way case law de-
velops over the years - and I am doing this 24 years now. If you look
at the way the case law develops, it takes one vein to really stick, you
know, where some courts get it identified down to a well-defined tort
and other courts start following it. All the other cases, I suspect, will
fall from the wayside, and you really may have a tort that takes root
and goes forward that's, maybe, better defined than this morass of
case law that we have today.
I think we are years from that right now, and I think we will be
discussing this on seminars for years to come as a result, as we try to
figure it all out.
Yes, sir.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: We have a real problem as appraisers.
We are required to comply with USPAP.36 We are compelled to com-
ply with the bankruptcy laws, and we are compelled to respond to the
state law, and they are not all together. And so the effect of it has
been, in my town where I live, is that we have virtually no appraisers
that are wanting to do bankruptcy appraisals. We have two attorneys
left out of a very, very large group in our town that are even trying to
file bankruptcies. So it's a real mess right now. Nobody knows what
to do.
MR. SHAPIRO: Part of the problem is that when you are being
called on to do this kind of work, they are not in bankruptcy for the
deepening insolvency tort. These things tend to occur when they are
in trouble, not when they are in bankruptcy. Once they are in bank-
ruptcy, you have either committed the tort or you haven't.
So if you are worried, then I think you got a lot out of today's pres-
entation, because I think that's really what you should take from this,
is that you ought to be worried and watching for this. Thank you all
very much.
36. Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice.
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